



#### VIRTUAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

VICTORIA PER INTELLECTUM

#### OPAR 2 VIS – Targeting Presentation – Pre D5



#### D5 Weather Report


- D5.1: Day, overcast + rain, winds from the East
  - FW CAS/AR complicated by low ceiling pushing aircraft into IR SAM envelope
  - RW CAS/AR complicated by reduced visibility
  - Strike missions likely need JDAMs or strike from low altitude
- D5.2: Night, broken clouds, winds from the North
- D6.1: Day, clear skies, winds from the North
- D6.2: Dusk, clear skies, winds from the North
- D7.1: Day, broken clouds, winds from the North-East
- D7.2: Night, clear skies, winds from the North-East
- D8.1: Day, clear skies, winds from North-East
- D8.2: Dusk, clear skies, winds from North-East





## D4 Enemy Situation/BDA - Ground

- Little effect on 11<sup>th</sup> Mechanised division at Gaziantep Intl except significant attrition of MLRS and radar SAMs during D4. Assess that 1 x GRAD and 2 x SMERCH remain.
  - The SMERCHs, with their long range, remain a significant threat
  - Assessed LIKELY that this DIV have already received SA-15 reinforcements, and they are a prime candidate for receiving further SA-15s currently working up at the Syrian Air Defence Academy.
- 10<sup>th</sup> DIV confirmed to remain based at Minakh, with SA-15s, the 10<sup>th</sup> CORPS HQ, SA-8s (indicating GRADs) and armoured units observed on D4. One Bde now detatched to support 12<sup>th</sup> DIV near Attaturk Dam. Remaining Arty now marginally operational after attrition on D4. Assessed HIGHLY LIKELY that remaining 1<sup>st</sup> Corps MLRS assets are still located here and firing on Hatay.
  - Armoured units observed moving north close to Minakh LIKELY a second Bde is preparing for counterattack on JTF forces at Gaziantep.
- 12<sup>th</sup> Mot DIV reduced to 2 effective Bdes
  - One continues to hold Birecik Dam
  - One remains IVO Attaturk Dam
  - Now reinforced by detatched Bde from 10<sup>th</sup> Armour DIV
- Little attrition and little recent contact with 2<sup>nd</sup> DIV near Hatay:
  - 21<sup>st</sup> Mech DIV assessed still holding defensive positions east of Hatay (in the absence of any observations otherwise from our forces in the area).
  - 22<sup>nd</sup> Motorised division assessed still holding defensive positions south of Hatay. Observations of SAMs indicate no movement of HQ or GRAD units.







## D4 Enemy Situation/BDA - Ground

- VID assess 5<sup>th</sup> Corps now carrying out recon to determine fighting area, LIKELY to set up a more robust defence of Syrian territory to protect against allied invasion. LIKELY to deploy within 24-48 hours.
- EVEN CHANCE that departure of 5<sup>th</sup> Corps will facilitate a mobilization of the 6<sup>th</sup> Corps.
- Previous indicators of possible 5<sup>th</sup> Corps presence now assessed to be alternative explanations:
  - SA-6/11 in north of IADS sector East likely either IADS moving mobile SAMs around to mitigate reduced airforce effectiveness or erroneous readings/intel plotting
  - Additional SA-15s IVO Gaziantep likely either reinforcements or over-optimistic BDA from previous sorties
  - Armour units IVO Gaziantep likely the detatched brigade from 10<sup>th</sup> DIV en-route to Sanliurfa front



# D4 Enemy Situation/BDA - Ground


- 5<sup>th</sup> Corps is a big deal!
  - 2 x Armour DIV (includes a total of 8 x SA-15)
  - 1 x Mech DIV (includes 4 x SA-15)
  - 1 x Mot DIV (includes 4 x SA-15)
  - Heavy Rocket Arty Regt
  - Air Defence DIV (1 x SA-6 + 2 x SA-11)
- Arrival of this Corps provides many options to the Syrians, and the new air defenses can severely impede our ability to provide air support to LCC.





## D4 Enemy Situation/BDA - IADS

- In Sector West:
  - Friendly air units continue to enjoy freedom to manoeuvre in the north of the sector and attrit any enemy SAM units that deploy here.
  - Further units remain in the south of the sector around Tartus and Homs. Indications of new units near Homs likely at Air Defence Academy.
  - Assessed LIKELY that no backup SCC exists in this sector based on pilot observations of SAM behaviour.
- In Sector East
  - 3 x SA-3 sites degraded (loss of SR) or disabled (loss of SR and TR), plus one SA-11 disabled.
  - 2 x SA-2, 1 x SA-3, 2 x SA-6 and 1 x SA-11 remain fully operational. Only 1 x SA-2 location known for certain. SA-6 and -11 observed on D3.1 not seen since
  - Moving SA-2 may move to protect Palmyra in south-east of sector due to arrival of new MiG-29s.
- In Sector South, no changes. IADS still fully operational.







## D4 Enemy Situation/BDA - IADS

VIS still recommends on-call SEAD as a minimum (or SEAD organic to package) for strike missions into Syrian territory due to the mobility of SA-6 and SA-11 systems (approx. 30 mins to pack up, a few hours drive within sector, 30 mins to set up – able to reposition within sector between our events).


Several IADs units assessed to be at or soon to be at the Air Defence Academy (TGT062) (SA-15s, SA-2, *possible* SA-6). Recommend targeting this in the next 2-3 days to slow the replacement of long range and medium range SAM units and maintain our advantage.





#### D4 Enemy Situation/BDA - Air

- Tabqa appears not operational. Assessed LIKELY due to destruction of all fuel storage and without significant Syrian logistics effort will persist until D11 (low confidence!)
- Hama AB runway was also hit. VERY LIKELY Non-operational until D9.
- Attrition of 4 x MiG-23 at Shayrat. 20 remain.
- 8 x MiG-29 observed landing at Palmyra D4.2. LIKELY these have been acquired from Russia and a new Squadron is not based at Palmyra. Another 4 aircraft likely on the way or have already arrived unobserved.
- Syria's primary airfields to obstruct JCTF air operations over the next few days are Shayrat (20 x MiG-23), Tiyas (22 x MiG-29) and Palmyra (est. 12 x MiG-29).
- Unknown if new Palmyra sqn is night capable. Both other airfields have night-capable units.
- Confirmed that Russian airforce is operating out of Egypt as well as Bassel Al-Assad and Iraq. Significant risk of accidental escalation remains.










#### D4 Situation/BDA - Sea

- Remaining Syrian units are:
  - 2 x Molniya patrol boat at sea
  - 2 x Rezny frigate in Tartus

Syrian navy still presents a threat to JCTF logistics.

- Significant and growing Russian presence. Currently not known how actively they will enforce the embargo. Chinese SAG en-route but LIKELY will not arrive for some time.
- VIS recommendations remain as for D4:
  - JCTF shipping is routed to stay at least 55 nautical miles from the Lebanese coast
  - If logistics security becomes a priority, target the Molniyas and Reznys directly







## D4 Enemy Situation/BDA - WMDs


- 622<sup>nd</sup> Scud Regiment (Aleppo) has moved to Alert Status 1. TELs have moved out of base and into hiding. To launch, they would need to rendezvous with a fuel truck from the storage sights at either the 622<sup>nd</sup> Base or the Rocket Fuel Factory (both in Aleppo, both under watch by SoF).
- No sign of fuel being moved from either location, therefore it is LIKELY that the fuel storage remains a critical vulnerability of the WMD system.
- Remaining Scud Regiments (both near Damascus) have moved to Alert Status
  2. Able to leave base at 30 mins notice.
- Syrian leadership discussing possibility of WMD test as show of strength.
- Recommend holding back 8 x GBU 31(V)3/B for short-notice strike on WMD oxidiser storage if needed)





#### D5 Enemy MLCOA

- ML COA 24 to 72 hrs:
  - VIS assess that Syria will continue to re-affirm itself as strong and aggressive by:
    - Consolidating current position:
      - 11<sup>th</sup> DIV defends positions IVO Gaziantep. Remaining SMERCH units retreat deeper for protection.
      - 10<sup>th</sup> DIV counter-attacks with min 1 Bde once 11<sup>th</sup> DIV is attacked. Potential for spoiling attack to gain initiative.
      - 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps maintain defensive positions nr Hatay to protect flank.
      - Deploy 5<sup>th</sup> Corps units "to setup a more robust defense of Syrian territory to protect against allied invasion" in the next 24 to 48 hours. This may free 1<sup>st</sup> or 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps units to pursue more aggressive COAs.
    - Extend territorial gains to the northeast:
      - 12<sup>th</sup> Mot DIV, reinforced by detached Bde from 10<sup>th</sup> Armour DIV, continue attack on Turkish forces, pinning forces in Sanliurfa city and attacking Sanliurfa airfield to isolate Turkish forces in the region. Later, continue NE to seize further key terrain (e.g. crossing at Gumuskasik and ultimately Ergani/Maden), allowing the annexation of a significant portion of SE Anatolia region.
    - Exploiting JCTF mis-steps, e.g. losses, adverse effects on civilians, breaking ROI etc. for domestic propaganda purposes and to encourage diplomatic pressure on JCTF.
    - Mobilise 6<sup>th</sup> Corps to enable operations to continue in the medium term



DISCLAIMER:





## D5 Enemy MLCOA


- ML COA 24 to 72 hrs:
  - Signs of pending invasion of Syrian territory (e.g. close to Hatay) likely to result in threats to use WMDs on CJTF forces and/or Turkish civilian targets.
  - Reconfiguration of IADS to maximise cover on key WMD infrastructure (esp. Aleppo)
  - SA-2 from Jirah redeployed to Palmyra to cover airbase and army base.
  - Airforce Assault Sqns deployed chiefly in A2A role to replace losses. CAP out of Tiyas AB, Shayrat AB and Palmyra AB.
  - Navy aims to enforce embargo, with Molniyas and Reznys aiming to stay within IADS coverage except when intelligence received about JTCF logistics shipping.
  - Syria have motivation for Russia to become more involved in the conflict and will likely look for opportunities to exploit ambiguity and potential for confusion. Russia can provide indirect support to their ally by creating ambiguous situations that make use of JCTF reluctance for conflict with Russia to escalate. VIS assess it is LIKELY that Russia will increase activity in the region even if not providing direct support in the form of attacks on JCTF forces or shipping: more flights from Syria, Egypt and Iraq, and increased naval activity.





## D5 Enemy MDCOA

- MD COA 24 to 72 hrs:
  - 11<sup>th</sup> DIV defends Gaziantep Intl, using heavy rocket arty to strike at CJTF FARPs and other targets. 10<sup>th</sup> DIV detaches a brigade to counterattack. 5<sup>th</sup> Corps reinforces 11<sup>th</sup> DIV, particularly to provide air defense.
  - 5<sup>th</sup> Corps reinforces 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps IVO Hatay. 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps launch attack on Hatay with the aim of ultimately driving far enough north to endanger Incirlik AB
  - 10<sup>th</sup> DIV holds the third brigade in reserve ready for a counterattack on the 56<sup>th</sup> DIV.
  - 12<sup>th</sup> DIV and detatched Bde from 10<sup>th</sup> DIV hold ground IVO Birecik and Attaturk Dam to allow force to be concentrated on repelling JCTF forces.
  - Mobilise 6<sup>th</sup> Corps to enable operations to continue in the medium term







#### D5 Enemy MDCOA

- MD COA 24 to 72 hrs:
  - IADS units redeployed north to provide greater defence in depth and prevent easy CJTF access to strategic targets, as well as improving their air-force's prospects providing effective CAP.
  - Airforce redeploys fighter/interceptor squadrons further north to alternative airfields within IADS coverage, and spreads night-capable squadrons more evenly to avoid reliance on particular airfields.
  - Southern SCUD regiments moved to alert state 1 and deploy to hiding places.
     922<sup>nd</sup> SCUD Regiment used to attack Incirlik and other targets with conventional warheads, disrupting ability of CJTF to project air power
  - Syrian navy exploits Russian support for embargo and absence of CJTF SAG to attack CSG with Molinyas, with Reznys providing support.
  - Syria conducts cyber-attacks on CJTF assets, causing further disruption to logistics





#### D5 Current TST List

• VIS recommend that SCUDs stay on the TST list at this point. No other target would be worth deviating from the planned mission to engage.





#### D5 Intelligence Requirements

- Full list provided in separate Excel sheet.
- New ones for D5 focus on:
  - Likely destination for 5<sup>th</sup> Corps
  - Capability and operation pattern for apparent new MiG-29 sqn at Palmyra

IR35		Where are the 5th Corps Divisions deploying?	D5.1
11.35	IR35.1	Are there SA-6 or SA-11 within 50km of the FLOT? If so, where?	D5.1
	IR35.2	Are there MBTs or SA-19s located near Hatay to the south or east (apart from IVO Minakh)?	D5.1
	IR35.3	Are there BMP-2 or SA-13 located with 12th DIV near Birecik or Attaturk dam?	D5.1
	IR35.4	Are there SA-8 located IVO Birecik or Attaturk dam?	D5.1
	IR35.5	How many SA-15s/SA-8s are located at Gaziantep? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.6	How many SA-15s/SA-8s are located at Minakh? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.7	How many SA-15s are located at Birecik dam? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.8	How many SA-15s/SA-8s are located south of Hatay? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.9	How many SA-15s/SA-8s are located IVO Taftanaz? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.10	Are any SA-15s/SA-8s located within 50km of the FLOT but not IVO south of Hatay, Taftanaz, Minakh, Gaziantep or Birecik Dam? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.11	Are there enemy SAMs located IVO Kharab Ishk?	D5.1
	IR35.12	Are there enemy SAMs located IVO Tal Siman?	D5.1
	IR35.13	Are there enemy SAMs located IVO Aleppo Intl?	D5.1
	IR35.14	Is any enemy rotary wing activity observed within 200km of FLOT? D5 to D8	D5.1
	IR35.15	Is any fixed wing activity observed into or out of front-line airfields (Kharab Ishk, Aleppo Int, Kuweires, Tal Siman? These may be possible staging points for Corps or Divisions.	D5.1
	IR35.16	What military traffic is observed travelling close to SoF positions in Aleppo - esp. BRDM-2 or ARV MTLB-U BOMAN on D5, larger formations D5.2 onwards. Report strength, type and direction of travel.	D5.1
IR36		Are the MiG-29s now located at Palmyra night-capable?	D5.1
IR37		Are the MiG-29s now located at Palmyra engaging in CAP or QRA?	D5.1

DISCLAIMER:





## D5 Targeting Recommendations

(Note limitations due to weather on D5, and few remaining GBU-38s)

- Strike Syrian Army HQ Building 1 (SYTGT001) to delay 5<sup>th</sup> Corps deployment. HQ Building 2 (SYTGT002) would be a good target of opportunity very close-by that would also delay mobilisation of 6<sup>th</sup> Corps.
- Further attrition of Heavy rocket arty and rocket arty from 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> Corps units, esp. SMERCH IVO Gaziantep if it can be located.
- Destruction of 1<sup>st</sup> Corps HQ at Minakh to reduce ability to coordinate (e.g. 10<sup>th</sup> DIV counterattack). Attrition
  of SA-15 at this location would also force Syrians to choose who to reinforce with new SA-15s and allow
  follow-on attacks against Heavy rocket arty located here.
- Continue to degrade IADS to allow strategic targets to be hit more easily and provide more permissive environment for CAP to operate. Specifically:
  - SA-2 and other SAMs IVO Tabqa, or any SAMs relocating to the north of their sectors
  - TGT062 (Air defence academy IVO Homs, a critical node in deploying new air defense units to replace losses)
- No known inbound logistics shipping for D5. No clear need for targeting naval assets today.



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#### D5 Vulnerable SYTGT

- Syrian operational targets that are currently not well protected by Syrian counter-air assets:
  - SYTGT001 Syrian Army HQ Building 1 destruction would prevent deployment or movement of Corps-sized units for 4 to 7 days, and ability to conduct an offensive using more than one Corps will be removed.
  - SYTGT002 Syrian Army HQ Building 2 destruction would delay mobilisation by 4-7 days, and cause chaos in the mobilisation and deployment of forces.
  - SYTGT003 622nd Scud Regt. Base destruction now has reduced impact as TELs are in the field, but fuel and oxidiser storage is one of only two such sites known.
  - SYTGT137 Rocket Fuel Factory destruction would prevent manufacture of more Scud fuel/oxidiser, and storage on-site is one of only two such sites known.
  - SYTGT100 Syrian Naval HQ destruction would severely impact coordination of maritime operations and reduce flow of supplies by sea, including loading oil for export, by 50%
  - SYTGT005 Syrian Navy Storage destruction would increase duration of navy repairs
  - SYTGT081 Al Safira Military Research Centre destruction would significantly hamper military research including biological weapons
  - SYTGT088 Syrian Intelligence Office Jirah destruction reduces Syrian ability to coordinate air strikes on friendly ground forces
  - SYTGT119 Al Assad Ammo Storage impact unknown one of three known ammo storage sites
  - SYTGT075 1st Corps Army Base destruction would reduce morale of 1st Corps units
  - Ammo factories totalling 67% of Syrian MLRS production capacity (2 locations), 50% of unguided bomb and 100% of PGM production capacity (1 location and 100% of AAA/small-arms ammo production capacity (1 location)
  - Vehicle factories totalling 100% of current truck production capacity (1 location), 40% of current BMP/BTR/Scud TEL production capacity (1 location), and final assembly of MiG-21 or MiG-23 (1 location)
  - Chemical weapons production facility
  - Oil storage targets totalling 21 days fuel for the Syrian army and 1060 air sorties (2 locations) civilian impact likely high
  - Various power plants/distribution, food processing, grain storage etc, each with civilian impacts if destroyed.

DISCLAIMER: